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ABSTRACT 
Any non-singular M-matrix is a completely mixed matrix game with Positive 
value. We exploit this property to give game-theoretic proofs of several well-known 
characterizations of such matrices. The same methods yield also many theorems on 
Sairreducible matrices that are closely related to M-matrices. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Minimax theorems have been used in [l] and [l l] to give alternative 
proofs of the Perron-Frobenius theorem and its extensions to the theory of 
positive operators. In trying to study other closely related classes of matrices, 
Ostrowski [9] introduced the so-called M-matrices and proved many remark- 
able properties of them. Ky Fan [2], Fiedler and Ptak [3, 41, Schneider [12] 
and many others have contributed to the theory of M-matrices. In a recent 
survey, Plemmons [lo] gives a list of forty equivalent characterizations of 
non-singular M-matrices and also gives a source for the proof of each 
characterization. 
Economists have been independently studying these matrices [7, 5, 81 
from the point of view of Leontiff’s input-output systems and factor-price 
equalization. Numerical analysts have studied them [13] from the point of 
view of splittings and iterative schemes. A further important connection is 
found in the theory of completely mixed matrix games. In fact non-singular 
M-matrices can be viewed as completely mixed matrix games with positive 
value. The exhaustive characterization of completely mixed games is con- 
tained in a classical paper of Kaplan&y [6]. Many of the characterizations of 
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M-matrices mentioned in the literature are consequences of the theory of 
completely mixed games and Perron-Frobenius theorem. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Sec. 2 we give a brief description 
of completely mixed games. We state without proof the theorems of Kaplan- 
sky on such games that we will need in the sequel. In Sec. 3 we will prove 
several of the well-known equivalent characterizations of non-singular M- 
matrices using game theory. In Sec. 4 we will prove some of the theorems of 
Fiedler and Ptak [4] on the closely related class of S, irreducible matrices 
using game theory. 
2. COMPLETELY MIXED GAMES 
Let A = (ujj) be a real matrix with m rows and n columns. Let players I 
and II play the following game. Player I secretly selects a column j and 
player II secretly selects a row i of the matrix, and a referee pays I an 
amount uii collected from player II. When aii <O, the amount - uii is 
received by II from I. The celebrated minimax theorem of von Neumann 
asserts the following: There are a unique constant 1; and some probability 
distributions, x = (xi, x2, . . . , x,) on the columns of A and y = ( yi, ya, . . . , y,,J on 
the rows of A, such that if the jth column is chosen by player I with 
probability xj, then no matter what row is chosen by player II, player I 
receives an average income at least t’ from player II, and conversely, by 
choosing row i with probability TV; player II guarantees for himself an average 
loss of at most o, irrespective of the choice of column j by player I. The 
constant c is called the value of the matrix game with payoff A, and the 
vectors x and y are called optimal strategies for I and II respectively. The 
optimal strategies are not affected if the same constant c is added to all the 
entries of the matrix A. Further, the players can restrict optimally their 
choices to the rows and columns of a square submatrix of A. In particular, 
there are an optimal strategy for player I and an optimal strategy for player 
II using min(m, n) columns and min( m, n) rows respectively. A game is called 
completely mixed with respect to player I if no optimal strategy of player I 
can skip a column. A game is called completely mixed if no optimal strategy 
of either player can skip a row or a column. Kaplansky proved the following 
theorems, which we will use in the sequel. 
THEOREM A. For a square payoff mutrix, if one of the playe-rs, say 
player I, can skip a column and still play optimally, then player II can also 
skip a row and play optimally. In the vector language, if an optimal x for I 
has xj =0 f&r some i, then there is an optimal y for II with yi =0 for some i, 
and converse1 y . 
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THEOREM B. (a) A game with value zero is completely mixed iff m = n, 
rankA = n - 1 and all cofactors of A are of the same sign and diflerent from 
zero. @) For every completely mixed game the matrix is square and each 
player bus a unique optimal strategy. (c) Zf the value of a compbtely mixed 
game A is non-zero, then the matrix A is non-sing&r. (d) Zf a square payoff 
A is not completely mixed, then v = mini maxivij =maximini vii, where vij is 
the value of the game deleting the ith TOW and the jth column in A. 
3. MATRICES WITH NON-POSITIVE OFF-DIAGONAL ELEMENTS 
LEMMA 1. Let A be a real square matrix whose off-diagonal entries are 
rum-positive. Zf the value of the game is positive, then the game is 
completely mixed. 
Proof. Suppose the game is not completely mixed. Then at least one of 
the players-and hence, by Theorem A, player I-has an optimal strategy x0 
with some coordinate, say xz, equal to 0. The new matrix with the last 
column deleted from A has a row (the nth row) with non-positive entries. 
Player II can constantly choose this row, so that the value of the submatrix 
game is non-positive. But with xi=0 the two games have the same value. 
This contradicts our assumption that the value of the game is positive, and 
completes the proof of the lemma. n 
LEMMA 2. Let A be a real square matrix, and let Z be the identity 
matrix of the same or&. Then the value v ( LX) of the matrix game A + aZ is a 
rum-decreasing continuous function of a, and v(a)+ k 00 as a-3 +- co. 
Proof. Let (Y > p. Since A + aZ > A + PZ, from the point of view of 
player I, A + al fetches at least as much as A + BZ when played intelligently. 
Thus v(o) > v ( /I). For large (Y, simply choosing all columns with equal 
chance gives player I large average income, so that v (a)+~ as o-+00. Using 
player II, we have by a similar argument v(o)+ - cc as a-+ - co. For any 
(Y, p with any optimal y(o) of player I in A + (YZ and with any optimal x( /3) 
of player II in A + PZ, we get the inner products 
W)@+4 Y(4) > v(a) 
and 
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Changing the roles of a and p, we get Iv(o)-~(p)]<Ia-p]. This com- 
pletes the proof of the lemma. n 
DEFINITION 1. A matrix A is called an M-matrix if there exists a square 
matrix B with non-negative entries such that A = SZ - B and s > p(B), the 
spectral radius of B. 
As indicated in the introduction, we will use the above theorems on game 
theory to prove the theorems that follow. 
THEOREM 1. Let A =(uij) be u real n x n matrix with non-positive 
off-diagonal entries. Then the following conditions are equivalent to the 
statement: A is a nonsingular M-matrix. 
(1) There exists an x > 0 such that Ax > 0. 
(2) There exists an x>O with Ax>O. 
(3) For any real square matrix C with non-positive off-diagonals and 
C > A, the matrix C is non-singular. 
(4) Each real eigenvalue of A is positive. 
(5) All principal minors of A are positive. 
(6) The inverse matrix A -’ exists and A ~ ’ > 0. 
(7) The matrix A reverses sign only for the trivial vector. That is, if 
x~(Ax)~ < 0 for all i, then x=0. [Here (Ax)~ is the ith coordinate of Ax.] 
(8) Every real eigenvalue of each principal submatrix of A i.s positive. 
(9) Every regular splitting of A is convergent. That is, if A = M - N, 
M -’ > 0, N > 0, then the spectral radius of M _ ‘N is less than unity. 
(10) There exists a positive diagonal matrix D such that AD + DA T is 
positive definite. 
(11) There exists an x>O with Ax>0 and Z~=laiixi>O for each i= 
1,2 ,..., n. 
(12) There exists an x > 0 such that fm each diagonal matrix S with 
diagonal entries 5 1, SASx > 0. 
REMARK. Many more of the available characterizations could be proved 
by the game-theoretic arguments; we have restricted ourselves to a few. 
Proof. We will prove the implications as follows. First we will prove 
(i)+ i) for i, j < 6. Then we will show (l)@(7). Next, for any i > 8 we will 
COMPLETELY MIXED GAMES AND M-MATRICES 39 
show (i)+ 1) and (k) Hi for some j, k < 7. This will prove that (i)o( j) for all 
i, j. Finally we will show that (l)o(A is a non-singular M-matrix). This will 
complete the proof of the theorem. 
(l)*(2). If we normalize X, condition (1) says v > 0, and by Lemma 1 the 
game is completely mixed. Thus the optimal x0 for Z is positive and Ax” > 0. 
(2)*(3). Since C > A, the value v(C) of C is at least the value v(A) of A. 
By condition (2), v(A) > 0. Thus v(C) > 0. Further, the off-diagonal entries of 
C are non-positive, and that C is completely mixed by, Lemma 1. Now 
assertion (c) of Theorem B when applied to the matrix C says that C is 
non-singular. 
(3)+(4). Let (if possible) Ax= (YX for some (Y < 0, so that A - aZ is 
singular. However, A - CUZ is a matrix with non-positive off-diagonals, and 
A - al > A. By condition (3), A -al is non-singular and we have a con- 
tradiction. 
(4)*(S). Let th e real eigenvalues of A be positive. We will first assume 
that the off-diagonal elements are negative. By assumption the product of 
the real eigenvalues of A is positive. The product of the complex eigenvalues 
of the real matrix A is positive in any case. Hence detA >O. By condition (4) 
the polynomial p(X) = det(A -U) h as no non-positive root, and it has the 
same sign for all X < 0. In particular, det(A + crZ) > 0 for all (Y > 0. We will 
first show that v(A) > 0. Let (if possible) v(A) < 0. Then by Lemma 2, A + CUZ 
has value 0 for some LY > 0. Since the off-diagonal entries of A are negative, 
player I cannot skip any column in any optimal strategy, so that by Theorem 
A the game is completely mixed. By Theorem B the matrix A + crZ, is singular 
so that - (r < 0 is an eigenvalue of A. This contradicts condition (4), and we 
have v(A) > 0. 
Now given any matrix A with non-positive off-diagonal entries and with 
real eigenvalues, if any, positive, by continuity we can find a matrix Z3 < A 
such that its off-diagonal entries are negative and its real eigenvalues, if any, 
are positive. Clearly v(B) < v(A). By the above argument v (Z?) > 0 and 
v(A) > 0. This means that aii > 0 for all i, for otherwise some row will have 
only non-positive entries, in which case v(A) < 0. Further, every principal 
minor matrix shares the properties of A. For example, the principal minor 
matrix A(M)=(uii), i,jEMc{1,2 ,... n}, has off-diagonal entries non-posi- 
tive. We will show that the real eigenvalues of A(M), if any, are positive. 
Suppose on the contrary that A (id) has a non-positive eigenvalue - p. Then 
[A(M)+fiZ]z=O for some z#O. Let u=(u~,u~,...,u,,)’ with ui=zi if i=M 
and 0 otherwise. This shows that the matrix C = (cii), with 
cii = uji, i,jE M, 
‘ii = uii for all i, 
=o for i#j and i orjBM 
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has (C+ flZ)u =0 and that C has a non-positive eigenvalue. But C > A, and 
hence u(C) > 0. Further, C has non-positive off-diagonal entries. Thus C 
satisfies (l)=+(2)*(3)*(4) and therefore the real eigenvalues of C and A(M) 
are positive. However, det C = det A (M) . II i B Muii > 0. This shows det A (M) > 
0, and the proof is complete. 
(5)=+(6). Let the principal minors of A be positive. As in the previous 
argument, by continuity we have a matrix B Q A such that all off-diagonal 
entries of B are negative and all the principal minors of B are positive. By 
continuity we can also assume that the cofactors Bii of B have the same sign 
as the cofactors Ai of A whenever Aii # 0. Since the principal minors of B are 
positive, the determinant of B + aZ is positive for all cy > 0. Further, u(B) > 0, 
for otherwise, by Lemma 2, v(B + LYZ) = 0 for some (Y > 0, and since the 
off-diagonal entries of B + (YZ are negative, by Lemma 1 the game Z? + (YZ is 
completely mixed. By Theorem B, B + al is singular. This is a contradiction. 
Thus u(A) > 0, and again by Lemma 1, A is completely mixed. Now consider 
the matrix 
b b,, ... hl,,-l h1,-a 
1,;; b, ... b2n_1 &-a 
. . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . . . 
b nl b,,, ... bn,-l b,,,-u I 
By an argument similar to Lemma 2, G( B (a *)) = 0 for some cx * > 0. Since the 
off-diagonal entries are negative for B (a *) as before, the matrix B (a*) is 
completely mixed by Lemma 1. Thus by Theorem B all the cofactors of 
B (a*) are different from 0 and are of the same sign. 
However, the cofactors B,, (a*) = B,,, i = 1,2,. . . , n. Further, B,,, > 0. Thus 
Bi,>Ofori=1,2 ,..., n. By a similar argument Bij > 0 for all i, j. By assump- 
tion this implies Aii > 0. Further, detA > 0. Thus A -i > 0, and this completes 
the proof. 
(6)+(l). Let u(A) (0. Th en there exists an optimal strategy y for player 
II such that A ‘y < 0 for the transpose matrix A r of A. Since (A r) _ ’ > 0 by 
assumption, we have (A r) -‘A ry < 0. Thus y Q 0, a contradiction. This shows 
u(A) >0 and that Ax>0 for the optimal x of I. This completes the proof. 
Having established the equivalence of (1) to (6), we will prove that they 
are equivalent to (7). 
(7)=+(l). Let x~(Ax)~ < 0 for all iimplyr=O.NowArisalsoamatrixwitb 
non-positive off-diagonal entries. By the symmetry of the condition (5) it is 
sufficient to prove that u(A r) > 0. In case u(A r) < 0, any optimal strategy y 
of player II gives (A ‘)ry =Ay < 0. In particular yj(Ay), < 0 for all i and 
y #O. This contradicts our assumption. Hence u(A ‘) > 0, and therefore 
(AT)-1>0,A-1>0,u(A)>Obytheequiva.lenceof(6) to(l). 
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(l)+(7). Let (if possible) x~(Ax)~ < 0 for all i, with x#O; consider J= {i : xi 
#O}. Now our condition is equivalent to My + Uy = 0, where M is the 
principal minor matrix of A with row and column indices from J, y is the 
vector x retaining coordinates corresponding to indices in J, and U is a 
non-negative diagonal matrix. But M+ U > M, and further, since (l)@(5), 
o(M) and hence u (M + U) > 0. Thus M + U satisfies condition (l), and hence 
by condition (3) M + U is non-singular. This contradicts (M + U) y =0 for 
some y#O. Thus (l)-(7). 
(g)*(4). Trivial. 
(4)=+(g). This is already contained in our proof of (4)+(5). 
(2)*(g). Let A=M-N, M-‘20, M-‘N=C>O. By assumptionAy>O 
for some y > 0. Since M ~ ’ > 0, Cy < y. Let C ru = (YU, where (Y is the spectral 
radius of C. By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, u > 0, cr > 0. Further, since 
u#O, (tl, y)>O. Thus a(u,y)=(u,Cy)<(u, y). This shows cr<l and hence 
the implication. 
(g)*(4). BY h mma 2, u(A + (~1) >0 for (Y large, and by (l)*(6) (A + 
GUI))’ > 0. Thus A = A + cul- al is a regular splitting, and we therefore have 
at least one regular splitting. Let A = M - N be a regular splitting. By 
assumption C= M -‘N has spectral radius less than unity. By continuity we 
have a positive matrix D with 0 < C < D such that the spectral radius of D is 
less than unity. Let D Tu = au, where (Y is the spectral radius and u >O. We 
claim u(A ‘) < 0, for otherwise A y < 0 for some probability vector y. How- 
ever, this means My < Ny and y G Cy < Dy. Further, a(u, y) = (u,Dy) > 
(u, Cy)> (u, y), and since (u, y) > 0, we have (Y > 1, a contradiction. Thus 
u(A ‘) > 0. Now (l@(4) applied to A r implies that the real eigenvalues of 
A r and hence the real eigenvalues of A are positive. Hence the implication. 
(2)*(10). As in the above argument, when Ay > 0 for some y > 0, A Tx > 0 
for some x > 0. Define the diagonal matrix D with the jth diagonal element 
yi/xj, where yi,xj are the jth co-ordinates of y and r respectively. We get 
(AD + DA ‘)x > 0, so that condition (2) is satisfied for AD + DA T. However, 
AD + DA T has non-positive off-diagonals, and from (2)=+(5) we have all the 
principal minors of AD + DA T positive. This is a well-known sufficient 
condition for the positive definiteness of the symmetric matrix AD + DA T. 
(10)*(l). Let (if p ossible) u(A) < 0. We have A ‘y < 0 for some probabil- 
ity vector y. Since D is a positive diagonal matrix, DA ‘y Q 0 and ( y, (AD + 
DA ‘) y) = 2( y, DA ‘y) < 0. This contradicts the positive definiteness of AD + 
DA T. Thus u(A) > 0 and we have the required implication. 
(11)=+(l). By assumption Xj=raiixi>O for some vector x>O, for i= 
12 , , . . . , n. Further, by assumption Ax > 0. We can normalize x, and therefore 
we can assume x to be a probability vector. When A is a 1 x 1 matrix, we 
have nothing to prove. By induction we will assume the implication for 
matrices of order < n - 1. Let A be of order n, and let (if possible) u(A) < 0. 
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Since Ax > 0, u(A) = 0. In fact x is optimal for player I. If player II has an 
optimal strategy y >O, we have ( y,Ax) =0 and Ax =O. But this contradicts 
our assumption E:‘f= iu+ri > 0. 
If player II has an optimal that skips a row, by Theorem B 
0 = mjn my r+ = mp mm t+ 
and uii < 0 for some i. However, if the ith row and the ith column are 
omitted from A, the vector 
satisfies the required conditions of (ll), and we have by induction oii > 0. 
This contradiction shows u(A) >0 and hence the required implication. 
(2)*(11). Since uii < 0 for i # j, this is trivial. 
(2)~(12). Since SAS > A, when (2) holds we have (12). Conversely, when 
(12) holds, S = Z gives condition (2). 
Thus we have proved the implications of the twelve conditions. The 
proof is complete if we show (l)*(A is a non-singular M-matrix) and any 
non-singular M-matrix satisfies (1). When condition (1) holds, we have all the 
diagonal entries of A positive and A = SZ - B, B > 0 for some s > 0. By the 
equivalence of (1) and (9) we see that the spectral radius of B is less than s. 
Thus A is an M-matrix. Also we know A - ’ exists. Conversely, if A = SZ - B, 
B > 0, and further if the spectral radius of B is less than s, then by continuity 
there exists a matrix C > B > 0 such that the spectral radius of C is less than 
s. However by the Perron-Frobenius theorem Cy =Xy for some y > 0, and 
(sl-B)y>(sZ-C)y=(s-X)y>O. Thus Ay>O, and y satisfies condition 
(2). The proof of the theorem is complete. n 
4. IRREDUCIBLE S,-MATRICES 
The theorem on M-matrices can be extended to a more general class of 
matrices if we use the fact that certain games have positive values and only 
completely mixed optimal strategies for one player. 
DEFINITION 2. Let Se be the collection of real (not necessarily square) 
matrices A with Ax > 0 for some x > 0, x #O. A matrix A in S, is said to be 
irreducible in S, if no submatrix of A formed by deleting any column of A 
lies in S,. We prove the following theorems of Fiedler and Ptak [4] using 
game theory. 
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THEOREM 2. Let A E S,. Then the following are equivalent. 
(1) The matrix A is irreducible in S,. 
(2) If x>O, x#O and Ax>O, then r>O. 
(3) If Ax>0 and x#O, then either x>O or both x<O and Ax=O. 
Proof. (l)=+(2). For the matrix game A condition (1) says that player I 
cannot guarantee non-negative income if he skips a column. Thus any x > 0, 
x#O satisfying Ax > 0 can be thought of as a mixed strategy after normaliza- 
tion, and we should have x>O. 
(2)+(3). From (2) we get x >0 in case x > 0. Let x have a negative 
coordinate. Let x* be optimal for player I for the payoff A. Since A E S, by 
condition (2), x* > 0. We claim that x* and x are dependent. For otherwise 
wecanfindavectoru=ax*+(l-a)x>O,u#Oandfurthery=O,andthis 
contradicts condition (2). Thus x+ and x are dependent. Further, Ax*= 
A(-8x)20 for some 8>0. This happens only with Ar=O. Thus x<O and 
Ar=O. 
(3)+(l). If A is not irreducible in Se, there exists a subgame formed by 
deleting some column of A with value > 0. Without loss of generality let this 
be the game corresponding to the first n - 1 columns of A. Let u be optimal 
for this game. For the vector 
AZ > 0, z > 0, z#O. Condition (3) says z >O, a contradiction. Thus A is 
irreducible in S,. This completes the proof of the theorem. n 
THEOREM 3. Let A be a real square matrix which is strictly copositive. 
That is, the inner product (u,Au) > 0 for any vector u > 0, u#O. Then 
Ax>0 fm some x>O. In particular, if A+ AT is positive definite, then 
Ax>0 for some x>O. 
Proof. We claim that the value of the game A is positive, for otherwise 
A ‘y < 0 for some optimal y of player II. Since y > 0, (A ‘y, y) = ( y, Ay) < 0. 
Since y #O, we have a contradiction. Let u be optimal for I. We have 
Au > 0. If we add a sufficiently small positive number to the coordinates of 
u, we get a vector x > 0 with Ax > 0. n 
THEOREM 4. Let A be a real square matrix of order n > 2. Then the 
following are equivalent: 
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(1) A, - A are irreducible in S,,. 
(2) A is irreducible in S,, and det A = 0. 
(3) Either detA =0 und adjA >0 or detA =0 and adjA <O. (Here adjA 
denotes the adjoint m&ix.) 
Proof. (l)=+(2). We can assume that for any x, y > 0, if Ax > 0, - Ay > 0, 
x#O, y #O, then x, y > 0. Also we can assume the existence of one such pair. 
The vector - y satisfies A ( - y) > 0, since A is irreducible in S,; thus by 
Theorem 2, condition (3), A ( - y) = 0. Th’ 1 .h IS s ows A is singular and completes 
the proof of the implication, 
(2)=+(3). Since A is irreducible in So, o(A) > 0 and for any optimal 
strategy x of player I, x > 0. By Theorem A, the game is completely mixed, 
and since det A =O, by Theorem B we get the required condition. 
(3)*(l). Condition 3 implies Au =O, WA = 0 for the first column u and 
first row w of adjA. We can normalize them to get probability vectors and 
conclude that G (A) = 0. Changing A to -A, we get c( -A) = 0. Thus by 
condition 3 and Theorem B, the games A, - A are completely mixed. Hence 
we get condition (1). This completes the proof of the theorem. n 
THEOREM 5. Let A be n real square m&ix. Then the following are 
equivalent: 
(1) A is non-singulur and A is irreducible in S,,. 
(2) A-‘>O. 
Proof. (l)+(2). By assumption v(A) > 0 and the game is completely 
mixed for player I. Since A is a square matrix, by Theorem A the game is 
completely mixed. Since A is non-singular, by Theorem B we have v(A) >O. 
By an argument similar to Lemma 2, for some (Y > 0 the matrix 
I 
(111 U12 . . . (I,“-a 
c= a21 u22 ... u2, - a 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
U nl cl,,2 . . . u,, - a I 
has value 0. Further since C < A, C is irreducible in S,. By Theorem B, the 
cofactors A1,,A2”, . . . , A,, are of the same sign. Similarly, by subtracting a 
suitable (Y from the entries of column i and row i, we can show Aii >0 for all 
i, j or Ai < 0 for all i, i. However, since the game is completely mixed, there 
exists an optimal strategy y for player II with y >O. Thus for any optimal 
strategy x of player I, Ax = v.e, where v = v(A) and e is the vector with all 
entries unity. Since x=vA-r.e and x>O, v>O, we have A-‘e>O. In 
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particular, CiA,i/lAI > 0 for all i. Since the Aii’s are of the same sign, 
A,/JAI >0 and thus A-‘>O. 
(2)*(l). If A 4 S,, then A ‘y <0 for some optimal y of player II. Thus 
y=(AT)-lATy 0 < , a contradiction. We therefore have an optimal strategy x 
for player I with Ax > 0. Since A is non-singular, Ax #O. Thus A -l(Ax) = x > 
0. Hence the implication. H 
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